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COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
CORPORATIONS: TOWARDS A
STAKEHOLDER CONCEPTION OF THE
PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE LAW*
Timothy P. Glynnt
Corporations are the dominant economic institutions of our time.
Thus, whether viewed from a local perspective, a global one, or one
that considers the interaction between the two, corporations will play
a central role as we confront the challenges of the next several
decades. One cannot begin to think about how to approach issues
from climate change, to health care, to the consequences of a rapidly
globalizing world, to the pressures on our democracy itself without
considering whether and how to alter the legal norms that frame
decision making by corporate actors.
The focus of our panel is stakeholder theory. Of course,
stakeholder theories take many forms and, indeed, may address many
different corporate constituencies, including workers, creditors,
customers, and the communities within which firms operate. Yet we
are all, in this general sense, stakeholder theorists. Since the purpose
of the corporate form is to enhance social welfare,' how could it be
* This Article is adapted from a presentation given on January 25, 2008 as part of Case
Western Reserve Law Review's Symposium, Corporations and Their Communities. Drafts of
the papers for the panel on stakeholder theory were submitted in the summer of 2008, before the
current financial crisis occurred. Although much of what has transpired is relevant to the
discussion of stakeholder governance, to help expedite the publication process, I have not made
substantial edits reflecting these events. They do not alter my core claims regarding the
production of corporate law-indeed, in my view, they strengthen them.
t Miriam T. Rooney Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Thanks to
Kathleen Boozang, Kent Greenfield, Crystal Olsen Glynn, Charles Sullivan, and Marc Poirier
for their helpful comments on this Article, and Joseph Fischetti and Daniel Gottlieb for their
research assistance. Thanks also to George Dent for his careful critique of my presentation.
Finally, many thanks to the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for the
opportunity to participate in this Symposium and for their accommodations during the
publication process.
I That the overall objective of corporate law is to advance social welfare or social
efficiency is uncontroversial. See, e.g., RENIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
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otherwise? The welfare of stakeholders beyond just management
(directors and officers) and shareholders therefore is not only relevant
but also central to the normative claims on all sides in the debate over
how the corporation and corporate law ought to be structured.2 The
real dispute is over how corporate law can best achieve its larger
social ends.
Those who favor the existing corporate law regime and those who
favor reforms that empower shareholders-including my co-panelist,
Professor George W. Dent, Jr.-argue that their approach to corporate
law is better for both shareholders and other stakeholders.3 Others,
including Professor Kent Greenfield and me, are deeply skeptical that
any corporate law regime that focuses almost exclusively on the
relationships among managers and shareholders, and privileges their
interests above all others, can sustain beneficial outcomes for
unconsidered stakeholders and society as a whole.
Professor Greenfield proposes an alternative conception of
substantive corporate law-one which integrates the interests of other
stakeholders directly into corporate legal principles and firm
governance structures.4 Although I find Professor Greenfield's claims
persuasive, my aim in this Article is different. It is, in a sense, far
less ambitious, since I do not propose particular changes in
substantive corporate law reflecting a broader stakeholder vision.
CORPORATE LAW, A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 17-19 (2004).
2 See id.
3 Defenders of the current law argue that, by shielding director decision making from
direct shareholder control, directors are free to act in the best interests of the firm as a whole,
and this results in decision making that benefits shareholders and other stakeholders over the
long term. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); cf Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). Professor Dent and
other shareholder advocates argue, to the contrary, that recalibrating legal norms to provide
more protection for shareholders will alter corporate behavior in ways that will ultimately serve
these larger ends. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting
Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107 (2008) [hereinafter Dent, Stakeholder Governance];
George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy
Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1232--33, 1270-71 (2008)
[hereinafter Dent, Academics].
4 Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043
(2008) (hereinafter Greenfield, Defending].
5 1 also will not focus on Professor Dent's criticisms of these claims, since Professor
Greenfield has offered his own responses. See generally id I do want to emphasize, as Professor
Greenfield has, that the kinds of stakeholder reforms we seek are neither
"anti-capitalist" nor disguised forms of "socialism." Certainly, we call for government
regulation, but so does Professor Dent and anyone else who thinks law-in this case corporate
law-is essential for markets to work appropriately. Stakeholder theorists believe as other
corporate scholars do, that corporations and markets can advance social welfare; we simply
differ on how corporate law ought to be structured to further this goal.
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Nevertheless, the issue on which I focus---corporate law's
production-is central to understanding both the existing structure of
American corporate law and how meaningful change might be
achieved.6
Who makes corporate law matters. Local, state, and national
communities have a stake in the corporations that operate within
them. But while these stakeholder communities regulate the conduct
of these corporations in many ways, they often do not make or
enforce the corporate legal norms that frame the governance of these
entities. On the contrary, states and, through its inaction, the federal
government allow corporate promoters (that is, corporate managers)
to choose the corporate law that governs their conduct. Because
managers will select the law that favors their interests, states
competing for corporate charters (most notably Delaware) craft
corporate legal norms to appeal to managers, not to all firm
stakeholders. Other states, seeking to retain such charters, have
responded by enacting corporate legal norms likewise favorable to
managerial interests.
Manager-captured production of corporate law therefore leads to
substantive outcomes that favor managerial interests.7 Whether this
system also is beneficial to shareholder interests is the subject of the
decades old race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-top debate.8 Here, I tend to
6 I am not the first to recognize this. Professor Greenfield has discussed the implications
of how corporate law is produced in his other work, and has argued for a new choice-of-law
regime similar to the one I propose. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS & PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 107-22 (2006); Kent Greenfield,
Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
135 (2004). Others have addressed this issue as well. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets
and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate Law, 74 UMKC L. REv. 41 (2005) [hereinafter
Greenwood, Markets and Democracy]; Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The
Mysterious Race to the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381 (2005) [hereinafter
Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware].
7 I am not sure anyone really disputes this. What is disputed is whether managerial
selection of corporate law is also beneficial to shareholders, other stakeholders, and society as a
whole. See infra notes 8, 18.
8 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1509 (1992)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, Federalism] (arguing that competition leads to rules biased towards
managerial interests), and William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66 (1974) (arguing that competition results in a "race for the
bottom"), with Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REv. 913, 915 (1982) (challenging
Cary's analysis), and Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. & ECON. & ORG. 225, 280-81 (1985) (arguing that competition results in a race to
the top).
Race-to-the-bottom theorists contend that Delaware enacts rules attractive to managers and
that market forces do not ensure that managers seek rules that maximize shareholder value. See
Bebchuk, supra, at 1509; see also Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebehuk, The
Market for Corporate Law, 3/1/06 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 134 (2006) (discussing forms
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agree with Professor Dent that the race-to-the-bottom theorists have
the better argument, 9 although, as Professor Greenfield has shown,
relative to workers, both managers and shareholders have won
(handily) over the last several decades. 10
Beyond the race, other effects of this production system are clear.
Manager choice results in the exclusion of other stakeholder interests
from corporate law itself-protection of these interests therefore
defaults to market forces and external legal regimes." Even more
troublesome, the current production system all but eliminates
stakeholder voice in the making of this law. Corporations are
creatures of law, but, bizarrely enough, their managers are not subject
to normal political or regulatory constraints in terms of the central
legal norms that frame their decision making.
12
Until we alter the peculiar way in which corporate law is made in
this country, genuine corporate law reform-whether the kind of
transformative change Professor Greenfield advocates, more limited
stakeholder-based reforms, the creation of greater shareholder
protections, or some combination-will not occur. To achieve
meaningful change, we need to move towards a stakeholder
conception of the production of corporate law. As is the case in other
areas of regulation, the communities within which firm activities have
substantial effects should be the ones to make and enforce corporate
legal norms.
That production drives substance should come as no surprise. Yet
how exactly the current production regime emerged, how it now
functions, and how it can and should be altered are worthy of further
of managerial opportunism which lead to state rules contrary to shareholder interests). Race-to-
the-top theorists do not dispute that managers select the law of their choice; rather they contend
that market forces-the markets for managers, control, and products-drive manager interests to
converge with those of shareholders. See, e.g., Fischel, supra, at 919-20. Both sides have
marshaled empirical evidence for their claims as to whether chartering in Delaware enhances
firm value. Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN.
EcON. 525, 555 (2000) (yes), with Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the
Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1775, 1820-21 (2002)
(no), and Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57
(2004) (no).
9 See Dent, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1138-39.
10 See Greenfield, Defending, supra note 4, at 1054-56; see also Greenwood, Democracy
and Delaware, supra note 6, at 446-47 (making a similar argument).
11 See, e.g., Greenwood, Democracy andDelaware, supra note 6, at 381.
12 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 110, 119 (arguing that, in this way, corporate
law is undemocratic); Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 41-42 (stating that
corporate law is inconsistent with basic tenets of democratic theory); cf Fredrick Tung, Before
Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 36-37 (2006)
(discussing how unusual it is for sovereigns to forswear its regulatory authority over activity
that occurs wholly or mostly within its territory).
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exploration. Part I of this Article describes the basic structure of
American corporate law and the unavoidable link between production
and substance. I then consider how the internal affairs doctrine-the
prevailing horizontal choice-of-law rule that provides that the law of
the state of incorporation governs the relationships among directors,
officers, and shareholders-facilitates the exclusion of all interests
other than managers (and to a lesser extent shareholders) from
corporate law making. Finally, I explore why the modern conception
of the internal affairs doctrine is both largely unconsidered and deeply
flawed.
Part II then develops the main thrust of my argument. I contend
that states within which firms operate ought to make and enforce
corporate legal norms. Put another way, at the most fundamental
level, if local, state, and national communities are to have a stake in
the corporations operating within them, they must have a voice in the
creation and enforcement of corporate law. Because substance and
production are necessarily linked, I begin by exploring why states
other than the state of incorporation have an interest in making
corporate law and the range of ways in which stakeholder
communities might approach reform. Next, I show why abandoning
strict adherence to the internal affairs doctrine is essential from the
perspective of any jurisdiction seeking to utilize corporate law as a
tool to protect stakeholders, and why an alternative choice-of-law
regime that allocates law-making authority based on substantial
operational and other contacts is both workable and preferable. Along
the way, I will respond to some of Professor Dent's comments.
I. THE PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE LAW: COMMUNITIES AS
STAKEHOLDER LAWMAKERS
In a globalized world, local, state, and national communities face
enormous challenges in seeking to influence and regulate corporate
behavior. One well-documented challenge arises from the ubiquitous
nature of the firm. That is, a business firm potentially exists beyond
the confines of any particular physical space or community. Indeed, it
potentially exists everywhere: it can attract or direct capital, develop
supply chains, sell products or services, and perform its operations all
over the globe. This provides firms with leverage when they deal with
the particular communities within which they operate. They can
demand concessions-from government officials, employees, or
others-in exchange for not leaving, for maintaining the size of its
local presence, or otherwise. And this produces competition between
jurisdictions to attract and retain corporate activity.
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Although its ultimate efficiency is in dispute, this kind of
interjurisdictional competition creates a race to the regulatory bottom,
and the willingness of communities, workers, and others to agree to
terms (concessions) they would not otherwise accept.' 3 Appropriately
then, the ubiquity of the corporation frames some of the
discussion about the relationship between corporations and
communities-something that is a recurring theme in this symposium.
But the challenge communities face in regulating corporations has
another dimension. When considering the legal norms that frame firm
governance, the corporation may be governed by the law of a
jurisdiction in which it has few or no operational contacts. In other
words, while communities struggle with how to regulate the corporate
activities that affect them, they have allowed governance of corporate
governance itself to be outsourced. The net effect of permitting
corporations such an opt-out of state law is that states have, by and
large, ceded control over development of a core set of legal norms
that frame corporate behavior. Indeed, states have surrendered it to
corporate managers themselves by letting them choose the law they
favor. Because communities have a stake in how corporate law is
produced, they need to take back the right to regulate these core
decisions.
A. The Narrow Focus ofAmerican Corporate Law
The prevailing American view of corporate law is, by global
standards, a narrow one. Again, the purpose of the corporate form is
to enhance social welfare. In somewhat simplified terms, corporate
law (or, more generally, entity law) usually purports to further this
end by serving two kinds of functions. First, it establishes the legal
form of the firm and its basic waivable or nonwaivable attributes,
including, for example, its legal personhood, equity ownership
structure, decisional structure, and limited liability. 14 Second,
corporate law potentially addresses three sets of "value-reducing
forms of opportunism" or agency problems resulting from the
potentially conflicting interests among firm constituencies: the
conflict between manager and shareholder interests; the conflict
between controlling and noncontrolling shareholder (or shareholder
group) interests; and the conflict between the firm (reflecting
managerial and shareholder interests) and others who are currently
13 See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Global Economy, Four
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 991-93 (1995)
(discussing such interjurisdictional competition and its effects).
14 See KRAAKMAN ETAL.,supra note 1, at 2, 5-15.
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viewed as outside the firm, including employees, creditors,
customers, and society as a whole.' 5
Unlike many other countries, the modem American approach to
corporate law focuses almost exclusively on the first two forms of
opportunism. 16 The structure itself-i.e., legal personhood and limited
liability-has important implications for other stakeholders. And
there are exceptions on the margins, including veil piercing and
enterprise entity doctrine; the duties owed to creditors in insolvency;
and corporate constituency statutes in some jurisdictions that allow
but do not mandate consideration of other constituencies, particularly
in the change of control context. 17 But the remainder of the doctrine
addresses the allocation of authority and accountability among
managers and shareholders.
"Corporate law" for for-profit entities therefore is treated as almost
exclusively concerning shareholder and manager relationships. This is
the case regardless of the conceptual lens (contract, property, or
agency) through which such doctrine is viewed. It is then reinforced
by how corporate law is taught and discussed: for example, most
Business Associations texts devote few pages to matters within the
third category or the implications of corporate law for other
constituencies. Treatment of other stakeholder interests is left to other
courses, if treated at all.
15 Id. at 2, 22.
16 See id. at 61-70 (discussing the various ways in which European countries in particular
protect non-shareholder constituencies and stating that in the United States, the primary focus
of corporate law is the manager-shareholder agency problem and to a lesser extent, the
majority-minority shareholder problem). Professor Dent seems to assume that European nations
are moving away from utilizing corporate law or corporate governance structures to protect the
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. See Dent, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at
1116, 1141-43. European nations have increased protections for shareholders. However,
stakeholder protections in corporate law and governance in Europe persist and, in some
circumstances, are expanding. Despite the pressures, co-determination has held its ground, as
have other, softer mechanisms for ensuring employee voice, such as work councils and
consultation requirements. See, e.g., ROGER BLAINPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE,
301-14, 366-67, 416-22, 452-53 (2007). Indeed, as discussed below, the United Kingdom's
recently enacted Companies Act mandates that company boards take into account a wide range
of interests beyond those of shareholders in their decision making. See infra notes 108-109 and
accompanying text; cf Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 550-
51 (2005) (arguing that continental Europe has embraced a model of corporate governance law
that focuses on corporate responsibility and concern for stakeholders, and indicating that the UK
is beginning to change its policies to favor this European model).
17 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003); Blair & Stout, supra note
3, at 303 n.144 (listing these statutes). See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders Under State Non-Shareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45
(1991) (discussing such statutes and their implications for workers). Moreover, the securities
regime is designed to protect not just those transacting in shares, but also others purchasing and
selling "securities," including bonds and other nonequity instruments.
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In excluding other stakeholders from explicit consideration or
integration, American corporate law privileges the interests of
shareholders and managers over all others. Managers have broad
decision making authority, constrained (if that is the right word) only
to ensure that the exercise of this authority furthers shareholder
interests-shareholder wealth or welfare.18
It is true that existing doctrine mandates that firm managers act in
the interests of the firm, not the shareholders directly. It is also the
case that particular aspects of the prevailing doctrine-such as
business judgment deference for board of director decisions-afford
decision makers broad deference deciding how to further these
interests. As a practical matter, then, these decision makers can and
do consider the interests of other stakeholders in making their
decisions. But they do not have to. And it would be an overstatement
to suggest that decision makers could opt to serve other interests to
the exclusion of shareholder interests. 19 Indeed, the obligation that
directors serve the firm for the benefit of shareholders is broadly
accepted in the literature, in practice, and in our corporate culture as
the central decision making norm.20 And it is what shareholder
empowerment advocates, including Professor Dent, want.2 '
Thus, while the ends of corporate law are broad, its focus in this
country is narrow. It largely excludes from explicit consideration the
interests of other constituencies-workers, customers, creditors, and
the local, state, and national communities within which corporations
operate. It imposes on management and shareholders no affirmative
obligation to consider the welfare of other stakeholders, and, in fact,
directs corporate actors (albeit imperfectly) to prioritize the end of
maximizing shareholder value over all other values. Protection of
other interests from corporate decision making therefore is left almost
entirely to forces outside of corporate law-bargaining, the market,
and "external" legal regimes.22
18 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 41-42.
19 Id. The obligation to maximize share value (at least to the exclusion of other interests)
is sharpened in the sale context. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
20 Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 49-50.
21 See Dent, Academics, supra note 3, at 1273-74.
22 See, e.g., Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 45.
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B. The Inherent Link Between Production and Substance: The
Outsourcing of Corporate Law
1. Delaware's Domination and Capture: Production Determines
Substance
This country's narrow brand of corporate law is produced in a
peculiar way. Congress clearly has the power to federalize for-profit
corporate law, but it has stopped short of doing so. 23 The federal
government does maintain a robust securities regime, and the
self-regulatory organizations it oversees also enforce rules that govern
the public markets. It has, however, left most of the rest of corporate
law to the states. As treated in much of the corporate federalism
literature, federal actors traditionally have been reluctant to regulate
the "internal affairs" of even publicly traded firms, 24 although they
have strayed from this norm occasionally, particularly in times of
popular discontent with corporate actors.25 Thus, for now at least,
almost all "substantive" corporate law remains state law.
At the state level, there is one dominant producer of internal
corporate legal norms, at least for larger enterprises. About 60 percent
of U.S. publicly traded firms are incorporated in Delaware-the
nation's second smallest state-and hundreds of thousands of other,
privately held entities are chartered there as well.26 This is true even
though a very small percentage of Delaware corporations are actually
headquartered in the state or have major operations there.2 7
Delaware regulates the governance of Delaware chartered firms
by, among other things, establishing the basic rights of shareholders
and the fiduciary duties of corporate managers. However, Delaware's
approach is largely enabling rather than regulatory, favoring private
ordering and decisional discretion.28 It is, therefore, strongly
23 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003).
24 See id. at 596-97.
25 See, e.g., Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware's VantagePoint: The Empire Strikes Back in the
Post-Post-Enron Era, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 102-04, 115 (2008).
26 See id. at 97-98, 126-28; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions
Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391 (2003); see also Div. OF CORPS., DEL. DEPT.
OF STATE, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2005), available at http://www.corp.delaware.gov
/2005%20doc%20ar.pdf (stating there were more than 695,000 active entities in Delaware in
2005).
27 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 568 [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race] ("Delaware, where approximately 58% of public
companies incorporate, is the state of location for less than 0.9% of publicly traded
companies.").
28 See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware
Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1749 (2006) (discussing the norms underlying Delaware
corporate law).
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deferential to management.29 This is apparent, for instance, in its
business judgment rule jurisprudence, its permissive approach to the
duty to monitor, and its hands off approach to shareholder ballot
access. For this reason, Delaware's corporate law is favored by
manager or director primacy advocates 30 and, more generally,
proponents of deregulation, but it is criticized by shareholder rights
advocates.
31
The slant of Delaware law is unsurprising, given that its
corporate-law decision makers are largely captured by managerial
interests. Managers are the prime movers in determining where to
incorporate or reincorporate, and managers can effectively block
shareholder attempts to exit. 32 Delaware is now heavily dependent on
its chartering and downstream corporate litigation industry. Indeed,
Delaware receives about 25 percent of its revenue directly from
charter-related fees and taxes, 33 and, when combined with the indirect
revenue produced from its corporate-law litigation industry, the
state's entity franchise may produce as much as 40 percent of the
state's revenue.34
All interested parties in Delaware have incentives to provide
some-albeit minimal-legal protections for shareholders. For
example, Delaware's corporate litigation bar would have less work if
the state's corporate legal norms were entirely clear or entirely
permissive. Because Delaware's judiciary delineates the outer
boundaries of acceptable managerial conduct through a contextual
common-law approach, domestic attorneys on both the plaintiff and
defendant sides are kept busy.35 Moreover, Delaware's common-law
29 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1931, 1963 (1991) ("[Delaware] corporate law [is] generally favorable toward management
prerogative .... "); see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race, supra note 27, at 599-601
(stating that Delaware law tends to favor management); Bebchuk, Federalism, supra note 8
(arguing that state competition leads to rules biased towards managerial interests).
30 See supra notes 26, 29.
31 See generally Bebchuk, Federalism, supra note 8, at 1435; William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing
that state competition results in a race for the bottom).
32 Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race, supra note 27, at 592.
33 See DEL. ECON. & FIN. ADVISORY COUNCIL, REVENUE FORECAST tbl.2 (June 2006),
available at http://finance.delaware.gov/defac/min_0606.pdf.
34 Maureen Milford, Delaware 's Corporate Dominance Threatened, NEWS J.
(Wilmington, Del.), Mar. 2, 2008, at A, available at http://www.delawareonline.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080302/NEWS/803020319 (noting that when taxes from lawyers and
others in Delaware's corporate-law industry are included, its charter-related business may
account for 40 percent of state revenue).
35 Cf Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 687-99 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth] (discussing the benefits
Delaware and the Delaware Bar enjoy from Delaware's domination); Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205,
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approach gives its judges the ability to calibrate the state's legal
norms to stave off the biggest threat to Delaware-the danger that, in
periods of popular discontent with corporate actors, corporate law
might be federalized.36 In other words, Delaware and the corporate
managers who prefer its regime need cover. If Delaware law were to
be perceived as too unfriendly to shareholders, its chartering franchise
might be in jeopardy. This fear looms large in the state and, according
to some commentators, at times has had a direct impact on its
decision making. 37 It therefore counsels in favor of establishing legal
norms that provide some balance, while maintaining a regime that
generally favors managerial prerogatives.
Thus, managers primarily and shareholders secondarily, along with
the Delaware corporate bar, have some potential influence on the
state's corporate legal norms. Almost completely excluded from the
creation of Delaware corporate law are other corporate stakeholders,
including employees, customers, creditors, and the communities
within which corporations operate. Within Delaware, corporate-law
matters are shielded from other political influences in the legislative
process and, more importantly, in its courts, where corporate law
doctrine is primarily created and entirely enforced.38 Moreover,
because the vast majority of firms chartering in Delaware do not
operate there, most of the costs of the corporate governance regime
the state maintains are externalized to other jurisdictions.39
Delaware's legal decision makers therefore have little incentive to
consider or protect other interests or stakeholders in their state
corporate law.
Finally, popular discontent with corporate actors has occasionally
spurred calls for federalization of corporate law. However, to this
1232-36, 1246-48 (2001) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Price] (same).
36 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1573, 1588-89 (2005); see also Roe, supra note 23, at 594-
98 (stating that the principal threat to Delaware's primacy comes not from other states but from
the federal government).
37 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Hem, Delaware Courts' Delicate Response to the Corporate
Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of
Corporations, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 207, 215-24 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking
Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 644-62 (2004);
Kahan & Rock, supra note 36, at 1618 n.173; Roe, supra note 23, at 617-18, 643; Thomas A.
Roberts et al., Director Liability Warnings From Delaware, Bus. & SEC. LITIGATOR, Feb.2003,
at 1.
38 See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 45
(stating that labor's influence over corporate law production in Delaware is weak); Kahan
& Rock, supra note 36, at 1592-94; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an
Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469, 473 (1987).
39 See GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 114.
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point, these calls have focused, by and large, on providing greater
protection of shareholder interests, rather than the interests of other
constituencies. Even in the post-Enron period, when the fate of Enron
employees' jobs and investments in the firm made headlines and the
disparities in compensation between high-ranking officers and others
attracted heavy criticism, the debate over corporate-law reform at the
federal level did not move beyond measures aimed at protecting
shareholders and the securities markets. Thus, while Delaware
occasionally feels the heat from Washington, such heat tends to focus
on shareholder protection.
As a result, no matter how important the impact of corporate
decision making may be for all stakeholders, the existing regime puts
the law of corporate governance beyond the reach of all except
managers and, to a far lesser extent, shareholders-as long as the firm
has been chartered in Delaware. This is what Professor Greenfield
describes as the undemocratic nature of corporate law: other
stakeholders have virtually no political influence over it.
40
2. The Internal Affairs Doctrine and the Spread of the Delaware
Brand
The corporate-law regime Delaware maintains would not matter
very much if it did not apply directly or indirectly elsewhere. But it
does. Again, the federal government could take corporate law
production away from Delaware, but it has not done so. Similarly, it
has not enacted choice-of-law rules that dictate which state law
governs disputes within business entities.
This leaves states to determine whose law applies. In most
circumstances, Delaware and other states adhere to the internal affairs
doctrine, a horizontal choice-of-law rule that provides that the law of
the state of incorporation governs the relationships between the firm,
its shareholders, and firm management. Despite some important
exceptions,4' this doctrine is widely respected both within and outside
of the jurisdiction of incorporation. It finds support in a special
provision in the Second Restatement of Conflicts, 42 and it has been
extended to govern the internal affairs of other business entities.43 As
40 Id. at 110.
41 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1317-20 (McKinney 2003).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 302 (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (providing that the law of the state of incorporation will be applied to corporate
rights and liabilities "except in the unusual case" where some other state has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties).
43 Glynn, supra note 25, at 132 (observing that LLC statutes in New York, California, and
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a result, Delaware law governs the internal affairs of a Delaware-
chartered firm even if the firm has no operational, equity investor, or
other ties to the state. The decision of where to charter a corporation
therefore allows managers to opt out of local corporate legal norms
without exiting the jurisdiction.
In addition, other states, responding to the ability of home-state
firms to opt out by chartering elsewhere, typically have chosen to
follow Delaware's lead in permissiveness."4 This is not because states
are seeking to compete against Delaware for a slice of the national
chartering market. As other scholars have demonstrated, few other
states have the ability or desire to engage in such competition.45
Rather, it is because in-state interest groups who pay attention,
including local attorneys who gain some benefit from local
chartering, have pushed for Delaware-like corporate legal norms and
sometimes other measures-such as anti-taker protections-to
combat the threat of losing charters to Delaware.46 As I will discuss
below, it is also because other in-state constituencies rarely push back
against such norms.
The cumulative result is the triumph of private ordering over
public mandates. Through the chartering decision, corporate
promoters can opt out of internal regulation by any state in which the
firm has substantial operations and where other firm stakeholders
(including shareholders) have far greater political power. And other
states' near universal response to this opt-out threat has been to soften
corporate-law mandates in favor of Delaware-style permissiveness.
The result is that the corporate legal regime Delaware maintains-its
brand-is spread far and wide.
This phenomenon is at the center of the race-to-the-bottom/
race-to-the-top debate in corporate law on which much ink has
been spilled.47 Shareholder advocates criticize the substantive regime
that has emerged as insufficient to address the agency problems
inherent in manager-shareholder and controlling-shareholder/minority
most other states expressly provide that charter-state law governs internal affairs of LLCs);
Larry Ribstein & Maureen O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REv. 661, 664-65 (stating that the lAD has been applied in partnerships and other
non-corporate business associations that were not traditionally state creations).
44 See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, Price, supra note 35, at 1222.
45 See id See also generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race, supra note 27; Kahan
& Kamar, Myth, supra note 35.
46 See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, Price, supra note 35, at 1221-22 n.74; see also Ribstein &
O'Hara, supra note 43, at 680-81 (discussing the role of local lawyers in pressing for state law
to retain corporate charters).
47 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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shareholder relationships. Some call for legal reform through federal
mandates.48 Yet too little attention has been paid to the conceptual
underpinnings of the legal framework that facilitates this race-the
internal affairs doctrine itself-and whether and when states ought to
adhere to it.
3. From Production to Substance and Vice Versa: Beyond the
Internal Affairs Doctrine
The internal affairs norm emerged early as a quasi-jurisdictional
doctrine. 49 The basic idea was that other states had limited power to
regulate a foreign corporation because the entity was viewed as an
agent or creature of the foreign state.50 That made sense at a time at
which corporate charters often were granted for particular purposes
and few incorporated enterprises engaged in activities crossing state
lines.5 1 Indeed, states typically required domestic corporations to
maintain economic ties with the state,52 and chartering states applied
their own law as a matter of territorial sovereignty. 3
Over time, as the conception of the for-profit corporation changed
dramatically, and firms operated more frequently across borders, the
doctrine quietly transformed into what it is today-a horizontal
choice-of-law rule. 4 Under the modem doctrine, promoters of most
for-profit entities are free to choose where to charter the enterprise.
Among the implications of the chartering decision,55 the most
significant is that the state chosen will govern the firm's internal
affairs. Thus, like various contractual choice-of-law regimes, the
internal affairs rule is premised in large part on party autonomy and
predictability.56 And, importantly, this is all the doctrine is. Because
the chartering state may have no other connection to the firm's
operations or relationships, its regulatory authority over the firm's
internal affairs is derived exclusively from the promoters' selection of
the state.
48 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from
History, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1793 (2006); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal
Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REv. 993, 1002-04 (2001).
49 See Tung, supra note 12, at 45.
50 See id. at 44-54.
51 See id. at 47.
32 See id.
53 See id. at 54-55.
54 See id. at 44-46; see also Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 665.
55 The chartering decision has other implications, including subjecting the firm and,
potentially, firm principals to personal jurisdiction in the chartering state.
56 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 302, cmt. g (discussing how the rule furthers
the expectations of the parties); see also Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 665 (stating that
the internal affairs doctrine is a contractual choice-of-law rule).
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Yet, even among contractual choice-of-law regimes, the internal
affairs doctrine is exceptional. Under the doctrine, the state of
incorporation is simply assumed to have a strong interest in
regulation, and, but for the application of an explicit exception or a
finding that the matter does not involve internal affairs, courts almost
never consider the countervailing regulatory interests of other states.57
In contrast, in most other contexts, states typically employ
choice-of-law frameworks that take into account not only the extent
of the connections between the parties and the chosen state, but also
the relative interests of potentially interested states.58 For example,
many states apply Section 187 of the Restatement when parties have
contractually agreed upon a choice of law.59 Under Section 187 and
similar approaches, choice-of-law clauses are presumptively
enforceable, but enforcement is limited by two conditions. 60 First, a
court will not enforce the parties' choice of law if neither the parties
nor the transaction has a "substantial connection" with the chosen
state and "there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice.'
57 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 302(2) (suggesting it would be the unusual
case in which the interests of another state would have a more significant relationship justifying
application of its law rather than the law of the state of incorporation); id. cmt. g (noting that, in
the absence of a local statute to the contrary, the law of the state of incorporation has been
applied almost invariably to matters addressing shareholders, directors, and officers).
58 See, e.g., id. § 6. Section 6, which articulates the Restatement's general choice-of-law
principles, provides as follows:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Later sections of the Restatement call for application of the law of the state with the "most
significant relationship," which is to be determined under the principles of Section 6. See
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 32-3 3 (2006). A plurality of states have adopted the Restatement approach; others tend
to apply various types of interest analyses which likewise take into account relevant connections
and interests. See id. at 63-65.
59 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2006: Twentieth Annual Survey, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 697, 713 tbl.1 (2006); Symeon C.
Symeonides, Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56
MD. L. REV. 1248, 1260 n.96 (1997).
60 RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 187(2).
61 Id. § 187(2)(a).
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In addition, a court may refuse to uphold the parties' choice of law if
it would be contrary to a fundamental policy of another state that has
a "materially greater interest" than the chosen state and the other state
"would be the state of applicable law in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties.' '62
Thus, states give contractual choice-of-law in the internal affairs
context special treatment. But there is no constitutional compulsion to
do so. Contrary to the claims of the Delaware Supreme Court,6 3 the
internal affairs doctrine does not have a constitutional dimension.
Although, as I will discuss below, there may be dormant Commerce
Clause limitations on the margins, individual states have broad
discretion to decide whether and how to apply choice-of-law rules to
firm activities occurring within the state or otherwise affecting state
interests.64 A few states, most notably California, already recognize
limitations on the internal affairs doctrine, 65 and the Restatement
articulation of the doctrine expressly acknowledges that it is not
absolute.66 Thus, for example, to protect local shareholders or other
interests, a state could choose to apply a choice-of-law analysis to
corporate internal affairs more akin to Section 187.67 Indeed, as I
discuss elsewhere, Delaware is very much aware of the genuine threat
such inroads into the internal affairs norm pose to the benefits of its
domination in the chartering market.68
Even more fundamentally, however, by its very conception, the
modem internal affairs doctrine does not apply to state regulatory
initiatives designed to protect constituencies other than managers and
62 Id. § 187(2)(b); see also Mark Kantor, The Scope of Choice-of-Law Clauses, 119
BANKING L.J. 724, 726 (2002) (discussing application of § 187(2)); Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2005: Nineteenth Annual Survey, 53 AM. J. COMP. L.
559, 619-28 (2005) (discussing important cases decided by the courts applying § 187).
63 VantagePoint Venture Capital Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113-18
(Del. 2005).
64 See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text; Glynn, supra note 25, at 115-17;
Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 716-21; Tung, supra note 12, at 42 n.29.
65 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
6 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 302(2); see also id. cmt. g (discussing when other
states might have a greater interest in regulating and noting that the incorporating state's interest
in regulating is weakest when the corporation has little or no contact with the state).
67 Cf Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 726.
68 In its decision in VantagePoint Venture Capital Partners LLP v. Examen, Inc., 871
A.2d 1108, 1113-18 (Del. 2005), the Delaware Supreme Court responded to this threat by
claiming that California and other states are constitutionally bound to apply Delaware law to
Delaware corporations (regardless of the location of their shareholders or operations). Although
the decision is doctrinally weak, the court's aim was not so much to persuade as to deter other
states from abandoning the internal affairs norm, and to create the appearance of ongoing
intejurisdictional conflict that might convince federal lawmakers to step in and mandate
adherence to the internal affairs norm. See Glynn, supra note 25, at 136-43.
1082 [Vol. 58:4
TOWARDS A STAKEHOLDER CONCEPTION
shareholders. 69 Again, the modem basis for the doctrine is the
chartering parties' choice of law. But the parties to the explicit or
implicit "corporate contract" are managers and shareholders, not
other stakeholders. Put another way, relationships between these
stakeholders and the firm, managers, and shareholders fall outside of
the scope of the explicit or implicit agreement embodied in the
chartering decision on whose law governs.
Of course, this is reflected in modem choice-of-law doctrine.
Although there are a few areas where the doctrine is muddled, such as
in the veil piercing context,70 as a general matter relationships
between the firm-manager and shareholder interests-and
employees, customers, creditors, and other "third parties" are not
governed by the law of the state of incorporation.71
The point is that the internal affairs doctrine is tethered to a narrow
conception of the role of corporate law-that is, that corporate law is
a form of private law regulating primarily the relationships among
managers and shareholders. If one conceives of corporate law more
broadly, as potentially serving, protecting, or integrating the interests
of other stakeholders, the internal affairs doctrine is unhelpful in
determining which state's law should govern in a context in which
such laws potentially conflict.72
Thus, what I suggest here is considered too rarely. States'
adherence to the internal affairs doctrine is not only voluntary with
regard to manager and shareholder relationships, but also simply
inappropriate when corporate law serves other regulatory interests.
That leads to the question, raised by other commentators, why
states other than Delaware continue to adhere to the internal affairs
doctrine.73 We have seen that it is not because the doctrine is a
constitutional imperative, as Delaware would like to have us believe.
Nor is it because there has been some kind of deeply considered
69 Compare RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 301 ("The rights and liabilities of a
corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can
likewise be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are
applicable to non-corporate parties."), with id. §§ 302-310.
70 Cf Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 425 (stating that most states
apply the state of incorporation when addressing limited liability issues and discussing how this
approach is deeply flawed).
71 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 301; id. § 302(1) ("Issues involving the rights
and liabilities of a corporation other than those dealt with in § 301, are determined by the local
law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.").
72 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 109.
73 See generally Tung, supra note 12, at 39 (addressing the puzzle of the internal affairs
doctrine); Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative
Explanations for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480 (2002) (discussing the
widespread adherence to the internal affairs doctrine).
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judgment about the doctrine's efficiency-that is, some generalized
agreement among state lawmakers and, more importantly, their
citizens, that the norms it produces are optimal or superior.
Rather, it is because the modem bases for the doctrine have been
largely unconsidered by lawmakers and reformers. During the early
days of incorporation choice, state legislatures did not resist judicial
adherence to the internal affairs rule, opting instead for regulatory
substitution (i.e., other legal measures to control corporate
behavior).74 Later, history and tradition, bolstered by stare decisis and
reflexive judicial deference to precedent or Delaware, have played a
role.75 For example, despite intervening, dramatic changes in conflicts
theory and methodology, most courts in recent times have adhered to
the internal affairs doctrine without any discussion.76
Beyond this, the continued preeminence of the doctrine reflects
who has paid attention to corporate law and who has not. Corporate
promoters obviously prefer to have the choice the internal affairs
doctrine affords, and local corporate counsel have been able to further
their interests without crossing managerial ones by pressing for local
substantive corporate law reform that tracks Delaware's
permissiveness. 77  Although there are some counter-examples,
shareholder advocates typically have been most concerned with the
agency problems in publicly traded firms and, for understandable
reasons, have focused on federalization as the alternative to Delaware
in this context. 78 Most of the time, the production issue has been
ignored by everyone else, largely because of the prevailing, narrow
conceptualization of the role of corporate law itself.79 In other words,
because corporate law is simply assumed to be concerned only with
manager and shareholder relationships, other constituencies and
interest groups-although greatly concerned about the effects of
corporate behavior-have largely overlooked how and where
corporate law is produced.
74 See Tung, supra note 12, at 89-92 (regulatory substitutes included antitrust, blue sky,
and labor regulation).
75 Cf id. at 96-97 (discussing institutional inertia).
76 See, e.g., P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1,
17-18 (1985).
77 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78 In light of the prevailing state-law regime, since the New Deal, federal law has been the
primary source of investor protection. See generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 48, at
1794-1822. Shareholder advocates are skeptical of state law not only because of Delaware's
domination, but also because of the prevailing pro-management responses in other states, such
as anti-takeover statutes. I discuss this concern in Part II.A.
79 This is reinforced by how corporate law is taught: while Delaware's domination
may bubble to the surface in class discussions, how often do corporate-law professors
question-indeed even discuss-the internal affairs doctrine?
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In this way, substance has determined production. The prevailing,
narrow view of the role of corporate law has not only constrained the
view of its regulatory functions, but has also facilitated the passive
acceptance of the peculiar way in which the body of law is produced.
Once one considers the possibility that corporate law is something
more than a set of terms governing private relationships among
managers and shareholders, the internal affairs norm seems, at
minimum, nondispositive and, at most, entirely inappropriate.
II. STAKEHOLDER PRODUCTION OF CORPORATE LAW: CORPORATE
FEDERALISM PROPERLY CONCEIVED
The substance and production of corporate law are necessarily
linked. How corporate law is produced determines the substance of
corporate legal norms; and the prevailing narrow conception of what
corporate law is (or is concerned with) bolsters the internal affairs
norm that sustains this system of production.
This link has not been ignored. Powerful interest groups come to
Delaware's defense-and the defense of the internal affairs
doctrine-because they prefer the substantive outcomes the current
regime produces.8° Shareholder advocates critical of Delaware's
brand recognize that reform will not occur there, at least not without
greater external pressure. While those who have tumbled to the
production issue have tended to push for federal regulation,8' rather
than pressing for other states to take a more active role, they
recognize that changing where and how corporate law is produced is
necessary for reform.
Yet the relationship between substance and production is even
more profound when one considers the interests of other stakeholders.
As it stands, they have no voice in the making of corporate law. They
have no influence in Delaware, and, by facilitating opt-outs, the
internal affairs doctrine ensures that their ability to affect corporate
legal norms elsewhere is frustrated. Unsurprisingly then, the interests
of other stakeholders are almost entirely foreign to corporate legal
norms.
The federal government could preempt this field and create a
federal chartering regime-something both shareholder advocates and
other stakeholder theorists have advocated. But, to date, it has chosen
80 See Glynn, supra note 25, at 140-42. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other
industry groups have been active in internal affairs litigation. For example, in support of a
petition for certiorari, they argued that the internal affairs doctrine is a constitutional mandate.
See Brief for Technology Network as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Moores v. Friese,
549 U.S. 821 (2006) (No. 05-1590).
S See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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not to regulate corporate internal affairs. And, indeed, were federal
lawmakers to consider such preemption, powerful interest groups
such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce would line up to defend
Delaware, as they have when Delaware's preeminence has been
threatened in the past.82 Thus, meaningful corporate-law reform,
particularly reform that alters corporate governance structures to
internalize the interests of other stakeholders, likely must begin
elsewhere.
For such reform to occur, state lawmakers have to abandon blind
adherence to the internal affairs doctrine. In other words, in addition
to substantive reforms to corporate law applicable to domestically
chartered firms, states will have to eliminate opt-outs by extending
such reforms to foreign firms operating within the jurisdiction.
In place of the internal affairs doctrine, states could adopt a
choice-of-law regime consistent with the general approach to
regulatory conflicts reflected elsewhere in the Second Restatement.
Some corporate-law reforms might create the kind of direct conflicts
with the law of other jurisdictions that would suggest limiting
application to foreign firms whose primary operational or equity
investor presence is within the state.83 In other circumstances,
however, where no such direct conflict exists, states with lesser
contacts might also apply their own law. Such a regime not only
would be essential from the perspective of the jurisdiction seeking to
utilize corporate law as a tool to protect in-state stakeholders and
workable from a choice-of-law perspective, but also is consistent with
the norms of federalism.
A. Corporate Law as a Regulatory Device
Before addressing how such a new approach to corporate-law
production might work, it is worth briefly considering the regulatory
interests it might serve. The Delaware Supreme Court has taken the
position that no state other than the state of incorporation has an
interest in regulating corporate internal affairs.84 Obviously, this
position is self-serving. But it is also absurd.
82 See Glynn, supra note 25, at 139-41.
83 See, e.g., Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 664.
84 See VantagePoint Venture Capital Partners LLP v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113
(Del. 2005) ("Under the Commerce Clause, a state 'has no interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations.' Therefore, this Court has held that an 'application of the internal
affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles, except in the "rarest situations,"' e.g.,
when 'the law of the state of incorporation is inconsistent with a national policy on foreign or
interstate commerce."' (citations omitted)).
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No one genuinely disputes that regardless of where a firm is
incorporated, a state has an interest in regulating firm activities that
have a substantial impact within its borders. How could corporate
law, which frames the firm's decision making that determines these
activities, not also be a legitimate subject of local regulation?
Corporate law is simply another regulatory tool, and, given its
centrality, a potentially powerful one. 85 The question then is not
whether states other than the state of incorporation have an interest in
regulating, but, rather, when lawmakers ought to utilize corporate law
to further regulatory ends instead of relying exclusively on external
legal regimes. My position is that, if it is the most efficient or
effective way to achieve a given regulatory goal, states should
consider directly regulating how firms with sufficient local ties are
governed and other matters falling within the traditional sphere of
internal affairs.
One goal might be protecting local minority shareholders from
insider abuse or oppression. To the extent adequate protection cannot
be achieved through local blue sky regulation or other "external"
regimes (i.e., common-law fraud), a state could seek to further this
interest by regulating corporate internal affairs directly. A number of
states, including California, already apply various shareholder
protections to foreign corporations with substantial local ties, albeit,
for the moment, usually in the closely held context.
86
A state also has an interest in protecting other firm
stakeholders--employees, creditors, customers, communities-within
the jurisdiction. Lawmakers might conclude that, to advance this
interest, reform designed to produce transformative change in
corporate governance is necessary. Professor Greenfield offers such a
proposal: he argues that social welfare can be enhanced through
integrating stakeholder interests directly into corporate governance
through board representation and altering the baseline decisional
norm to enhance the welfare of the firm as a whole, rather than
shareholder value alone.87
85 Cf Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 47-48 (discussing how
corporate law drives firm decision making, and how reform of corporate law would alter firm
decisions).
86 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006) (applying aspects of
California's corporate code to foreign corporations with substantial operational or equity
ownership ties to the state). California also has applied its insider trading law to publicly traded
foreign corporations. See Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005),
review denied, No. S141028, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 3559 (Mar. 15, 2006), cert. denied, Moores v.
Friese, 549 U.S. 821 (2006).
87 See generally GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 123-85; Greenfield, Defending, supra note
4, at 1054-55.
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Yet, even short of such transformative change, regulation that
implicates internal affairs can be a valuable regulatory tool for
protecting the welfare of other stakeholders. Put differently,
lawmakers might consider altering corporate law to address the third
type of agency problems discussed in Part L.A (firm opportunism
vis-A-vis nonshareholders) in ways other than the direct representation
model or altering significantly the norm of enhancing shareholder
wealth. Some of these approaches also might be implemented to
protect stakeholder interests that cannot be protected through board
representation.
Consider, for example, how corporate-law reform might serve
more modest goals, such as enhancing legal compliance or ensuring
that firms internalize costs otherwise borne by nonshareholder
stakeholders. The legal structure described in Part L.A counsels
managers to place shareholder interests in the firm (perhaps along
with their own) above all others.88 Managers therefore operate the
firm not for the benefit of all stakeholders, but rather to maximize the
firm's surplus to split between themselves and the shareholders. The
size of the surplus-not the overall wealth the firm has produced or
its impact on social welfare-is the one and only bottom line.89
Except on the margins, corporate law does not prevent managers
from increasing the surplus by externalizing costs onto other
stakeholders. On the contrary, assuming such externalization
increases the surplus, the legal framework suggests that this is
precisely what managers are supposed to do.90 Protection of
stakeholder interests other than those of managers and shareholders is
left to outside forces: either nonlegal forces, including bargaining and
the market, or external legal regimes. Where lawmakers conclude that
bargaining and market forces do not provide a sufficient check
against the negative externalities of surplus-producing firm
activities, 91 they regulate firm conduct in a variety of ways-e.g.,
88 Indeed, Professor Dent and other shareholder advocates criticize the current regime
because, in their view, it does not do a good enough job of ensuring management actually
maximizes shareholder value.
89 See, e.g., Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 41-42.
90 See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S
NEWEST EXPORT 49-65 (2001) (discussing the impact of limited liability on corporate decision
making); Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 46-48.
91 My focus is on how lawmakers should regulate corporations. Space concerns prevent
me from delving too deeply into whether and when the conduct of corporate actors ought to be
regulated. As Professor Greenfield has argued, we are well past the point where we can assume
that bargaining and unregulated market forces will protect other stakeholders adequately. See
Greenfield, Defending, supra note 4, at 1059-61. Although we certainly disagree on both the
amount and type of regulation of corporate conduct that is needed, Professor Dent does not
dispute that some regulation is necessary, both to protect shareholders and to protect other
stakeholders. I do take issue with Professor Dent's suggestion that employees are in a better
1088 [Vol. 58:4
TOWARDS A STAKEHOLDER CONCEPTION
through employment and labor law, health and safety regulations, and
environmental protections.
Yet, critically, the norms that lead decision makers to externalize
in the first place also lead them to act in ways that may limit the
effectiveness of such external regulation. With maximizing the
surplus as the goal, management is likely to comply with external
legal mandates only to the extent that the costs of noncompliance
exceed the costs of compliance.92 This incentive to comply minimally
is further exacerbated by limited liability, which caps the potential
costs of noncompliance and allows cost avoidance through firm
structuring, thereby creating incentives to take excessive risks.93
In addition, the substance and effectiveness of external legal
mandates are directly affected by the current corporate-law regime in
other ways. Under the Caremark94 and Stone95 line of cases, directors
have no meaningful duty to establish monitoring systems that might
otherwise root out and correct illegal or other socially harmful
conduct within the enterprise-not even one enforceable by
shareholders. Moreover, because it implicates internal corporate
arrangements, many states apply the chartering state's corporate
veil-piercing and enterprise entity doctrine,96 which, if too protective
of corporate actors, may aid in the defeat of local policy preferences.
Finally, there is a feedback loop that puts enormous pressure on the
ability of our regulatory institutions to sustain their checks on
corporate behavior over time. In service of only the interests of
shareholders and themselves, and free to decide under the business
judgment presumption how this end is to be achieved, management
can use the firm's considerable wealth to influence the substance and
enforcement of the very external legal mandates that might otherwise
protect other stakeholders. Such influence occurs not only on the front
position than shareholders to protect themselves. He mentions labor unions at various points,
but, of course, as Professor Greenfield notes, a very small percentage of the labor force is
unionized in this country. See Greenfield, Defending, supra note 4, at 1060. As for individual
employees, for a host of reasons, many face significant bargaining disadvantages. See, e.g.,
GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 41-71 (discussing the relative position of workers and
shareholders in the firm); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in
Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the
Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381, 1389 n.28 (2008) (citing literature).
92 Cf GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 73-74 (discussing the view that as long as the
expected penalties from illegality are less than profits, the corporation should act illegally).
93 Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 88 ("If regulatory schemes seek
to make firms internalize costs they would otherwise externalize, but business law allows them
to decline the resulting liability, the regulatory scheme fails.").
94 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
95 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
96 See, e.g., Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 425.
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end, but also through downstream pressure on regulatory decision
making or litigated challenges that chip away at the protections
provided.
97
Perhaps a recalibration of the existing legal norms that Delaware
currently establishes to provide greater protection against
manager-shareholder agency problems in publicly traded firms would
ameliorate aspects of this problem. Even if that is true, however, such
changes would not alter the basic incentives to externalize costs and
resist regulation or regulatory compliance. Indeed, those who contend
that reducing manager-shareholder agency problems that prevail in
publicly traded firms will result in both greater returns and better
treatment of other stakeholders have not explained why privately held
firms lacking such problems often do not act consistent with this
model. 98
Of course, not all firm decision makers aim for minimal
compliance, seek to maximize externalization, succumb to limited
liability's moral hazard, or otherwise behave in ways harmful to other
stakeholders or their communities. But such socially responsible
behavior occurs despite corporate law, not because of it. And those
with a preference for operating their firms in a more socially
responsible way face substantial pressures in competitive markets to
act otherwise.
99
97 It is worth noting that while the interests of managers, shareholders, and other
stakeholders sometimes may overlap, when powerful forces such as the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce or the Business Roundtable push on behalf of "American business interests" for
particular substantive outcomes, the record demonstrates that they are doing so in the interest of
managers first and shareholders second, not in the interest of other stakeholders. See, e.g.,
Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006,
at Al; Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (discussing
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's successful litigation strategies on behalf of business
interests); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 850-65 (2005) (arguing that the powers of directors disproportionately
outweigh the powers of shareholders).
98 The examples are too numerous to catalogue. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The
Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5-6 (2008) (listing frequent criticisms of
private equity, including elimination of jobs); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 68 (Sept.-Oct. 1989) (indicating that the three
constituencies of a leveraged buy-out association are the partners, the managers with substantial
equity stakes, and institutional investors); Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption
Against Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste Transfer
Stations, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1147, 1200-01 (2007) (arguing that without government
intervention, firms will seek to externalize costs when faced with market competition).
But, for the same reason, egregious ones are easy to find. See, e.g., David Barstow and
Lowell Bergman, A Family's Fortune, a Legacy of Blood and Tears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003
at Al; Charles Duhigg, At Many Homes, More Profit and Less Nursing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2007, at AI; see also Steven Pearlstein, Private Equity's Bottom Line for Workers, WASH. POST,
Apr. 4, 2007, at D 1.
99 See GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 93 (pressure in competitive markets for goods and
services); MITCHELL, supra note 90, at 51-52 (pressure to maximize profit in the short term).
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When lawmakers determine that existing external regulation is
insufficient to protect other stakeholder interests, they have a number
of options. For instance, they could seek to reduce noncompliance
by increasing enforcement efforts or imposing greater sanctions.
Yet corporate-law reform-which addresses decision making and
management obligations directly-may be a more efficient or
effective way of serving the same end. Altering corporate legal norms
might, for example, impose fewer enforcement costs, promote
self-regulation, reduce information costs for regulators, or alter the
decision making norms that frustrate efforts to protect the interests of
stakeholders.
What might such corporate-law reforms look like? There are many
mechanisms for facilitating greater internalization of stakeholder
interests.'00 I will briefly mention a few possibilities, although my aim
in this Article is not to advocate for any particular type of reform.
Rather, it is to suggest that, once the veil of the internal affairs norm
is lifted, state lawmakers can explore various options for integrating
stakeholder interests into corporate law. Unlike a representation
model, most of these other approaches would protect stakeholder
interests without altering the norm of enhancing shareholder profit.
Moreover, while some clearly cross into what is traditionally
considered internal affairs, others might simply be viewed as
expanding familiar external regulatory devices. Each has its own set
of benefits, costs, and enforcement issues that lawmakers would have
to balance carefully before deciding whether and how to implement it.
The unifying idea underlying each type of reform (individually or in
some combination) is to enhance protection for other stakeholders by
altering incentives, decision making processes, or the participants.
For example, in various contexts, scholars have advocated
enhancing corporate disclosure or information sharing requirements
to protect nonshareholder stakeholder groups and other interests.'
Although publicly traded firms are already subject to robust
disclosure obligations, these obligations are limited in scope, since
they are designed to protect securities holders and do not apply to
'0 Cf KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 23-70 (discussing a range of strategies for
addressing agency problems).
101 See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: "Cumulative Materiality" in
Corporate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483 (2005)
(environmental impact); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity:
Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795 (1989) (chemical exposure
and toxicity); David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-
Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137 (2007) (social, environmental, and governance
information).
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privately held entities.102 As others have detailed, broader disclosure
mandates for other matters may create various efficiencies,10 3 alter
decision making norms, and create incentives to improve internal
controls and auditing procedures.
Another possible method of protecting stakeholder interests and
enhancing compliance with external legal mandates is by providing
various corporate actors with the tools or incentives to monitor firm
activity, prevent or correct illegal conduct, or otherwise protect
stakeholder interests. Such "deputization" also can come in a wide
variety of other forms. For example, the gatekeeper approach
reflected in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 104 including up-the-ladder
reporting obligations for attorneys and the enhanced role of
independent auditors, could be expanded to perform broader
functions, such as ensuring compliance with environmental,
employment, or health and safety standards.10 5 In addition, lawmakers
could impose vicarious liability on high-ranking corporate officers for
the firm's tort or tort-like statutory violations. As I have argued
elsewhere, such a regime would counteract limited liability's moral
hazard by ensuring that at least one person within the firm internalizes
tort risks so that the firm will monitor, prevent, and spread such risks
in a more socially optimal way.10 6  Furthermore, as Professor
102 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 79 (stating that, unlike in other countries,
closely held firms have no duty to publicly disclose their financial statements).
'
0 3See supra note 101. It is well-known that these efficiencies may include lowering
external monitoring costs and addressing informational asymmetries. See Monsma & Olson,
supra note 101, at 140-41. Disclosure therefore potentially facilitates market-based and
regulatory accountability and, by addressing asymmetries, reduces the need for other types of
regulation.
104 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
105 For a discussion of the role of gatekeepers in the securities context, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003) (discussing the gatekeeping function of attorneys in the wake of
Enron and other corporate scandals). Scholars have argued that independent gatekeeper
monitoring can improve legal compliance in other contexts. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund,
Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319,
378-83 (2005).
106Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond "Unlimiting" Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2004). Although I cannot provide a full
account here, in the article I demonstrate why, given their unique role, high-ranking officers are
the firm's most efficient risk bearers: they are best situated to monitor and avoid risks, and to
implement efficient levels of risk spreading among customers, shareholders, and insurers. And
such officer liability, unlike shareholder liability, cannot be evaded through judgment proofing
techniques. I also detail in the article why, contrary to Professor Dent's claims, see Dent,
Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1132-33, such a regime would not result in unduly
cautious behavior. Professor Dent proposes that corporate officers be subject to a duty of care.
See id. I am not sure to whom this duty would run. If it runs to third parties, it would be a new
form of personal supervisory liability-under current law, the entity (as the principal), not its
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Greenfield has suggested, shareholders or others could be given
standing to enjoin or void corporate acts that violate the law. 10 7 Even
board representation by certain kinds of shareholders-e.g.,
institutional investors with long-term investment horizons-might
further the interests of some nonequity stakeholders, albeit
imperfectly.
Lawmakers might also consider a number of what I loosely
characterize as process-oriented reforms. For example, lawmakers
unsatisfied with the vacuous Caremark/Stone duty to monitor might
impose an independent, generalized duty on the board of directors to
establish and maintain reasonable monitoring and compliance systems
to prevent and correct unlawful or tortious conduct. Such a duty
might be enforceable by the shareholders, the attorney general, or
others. A more dramatic reform would be the creation of consultation
or participation requirements that would give stakeholders a voice in
firm decision making processes, particularly if they are combined
with disclosure obligations and other mandates. Such participation
could be achieved in a variety of ways short of board representation,
including mandatory consultation with works councils or community
representatives on decisions or planning that materially affect the
relevant stakeholder groups.10 8 Finally, corporate law could impose
on board members duties to consider other interests besides
shareholders in fulfilling obligations to enhance the wealth or success
of the firm. This approach is reflected in the director duty to promote
the success of any company established in the U.K. Companies Act of
2006:
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers,
in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of
individual supervisors, normally is liable for negligent supervision. Although I would go further,
such a proposal would move the current regime in the direction of what I propose. If Professor
Dent is simply arguing that the duty to act with care in operating the corporation (for the benefit
of it shareholders) be enhanced, this would not reduce limited liability's moral hazard because,
again, it may be in the best interest of the firm and its shareholders to externalize onto others as
many costs as possible.
107 GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 94-101.
108 Consultation requirements with works councils and other worker representatives are
mandated under European Union law and the law of a number of European Union countries.
These include, with regard to certain enterprises, ongoing duties to consult with worker
representatives, as well as obligations triggered by the contemplation of certain large-scale
changes in the enterprise. See BLAINPAIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 301-14, 366-67, 416-22,
452-53. Others have proposed additional ways to give workers voice in important firm
decisions. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations:
The Case for Non-Binding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U.
L. REv. 871 (2007).
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the company for the benefit of its members [shareholders] as
a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters)
to--
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long
term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business
relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the
community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a
reputation for high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the
company.109
The U.K. Companies Act does not abandon shareholder primacy;
however, unlike American-style constituency statutes, it imposes
a legally enforceable obligation on the board to consider non-
shareholder interests in the decision making process.
Again, these ideas are tentative: my point is that there are many
ways in which lawmakers might utilize corporate law to address the
third category of agency problems now left entirely to external legal
regimes. Convinced that one or more of these approaches are
necessary or superior to others in serving underlying ends, lawmakers
outside of the state of incorporation would have a strong interest in
regulating, whether or not corporate internal affairs are implicated.
A serious objection to such proposals is the fear of unintended
consequences. Professor Dent argues that managers might utilize
stakeholder-based reforms in their local jurisdictions to further their
own interests or otherwise exacerbate the manager-shareholder
agency problem.1 0 As he notes, this criticism has been lodged against
state anti-takeover regimes and American-style constituency states."'
It is also one reason why shareholder advocates have traditionally
preferred federalization of corporate law to state-level reform.
109 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (Eng.).
10 See Dent, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1139-40; see, e.g., ROE, supra note
38, at 45 (suggesting this possibility).
III Dent, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 3, at 1139-40.
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Although this is a legitimate concern, it extends only to application
of local law to firms-most notably publicly traded ones-in which
there are significant agency problems arising from the "separation
of ownership and control." It is not a genuine risk in many other,
privately held firms. Furthermore, the problem of managerial
entrenchment already exists, both in Delaware (where business
judgment deference and available defensive measures against
takeovers are spacious enough that managers often can reach the
same result as, say, under a corporate constituency statute or
anti-takeover provision) and in other jurisdictions. In other words, this
is a persistent problem under the current regime; it is not one unique
to how corporate law would be produced under my proposal. Nor
would abandoning the internal affairs doctrine necessarily make the
problem worse-on the contrary, shareholders likely would have a
greater voice in the fashioning of corporate law outside of Delaware,
and could press for greater protections.
Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Dent that the risk
of managerial opportunism always remains. This risk counsels
caution and a careful weighing of interests and vulnerabilities
of all stakeholders, including shareholders. With regard to
stakeholder-based reforms specifically, where it arises, the threat of
managerial opportunism could be alleviated in a number of ways,
including by counterbalancing greater stakeholder protections with
greater shareholder protections. As Professor Dent notes, the U.K.
Companies Act attempts to strike this balance,1 12 and similar
measures could be included in other types of stakeholder-based
reforms. 
1 3
In conclusion, corporate law is one tool-and a powerful one-
available to lawmakers to achieve regulatory objectives. The
corporate legal norms that affect decision making in firms whose
operations have significant local effects are an appropriate subject of
local regulation, whether or not such norms implicate internal affairs.
In the next section, I will address circumstances in which the exercise
of regulatory authority is most appropriate at the federal level.
Otherwise, states within which firms are operated or shares are owned
have compelling reasons to make corporate law-to address the
effects of firm decision making on workers, customers, creditors, the
environment, and, yes, shareholders, too. This is true whether firms
are chartered locally or elsewhere.
112Id. at 1129 n.98.
13 For example, to counterbalance stakeholder representation on the board of directors,
shareholders could be given more meaningful voting rights in electing their board
representatives.
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B. Production: Towards a New Corporate Federalism
States have an interest in regulating corporate activity within their
borders, and, in some circumstances, lawmakers may conclude that
this interest extends to matters within corporate law itself. To engage
in such regulation, however, states will have to abandon strict
adherence to the internal affairs doctrine. Instead, they should
approach conflicts of law in this context as they would other legal
doctrines that address the behavior of corporations or principal
corporate actors.
1 14
States' utilization of corporate law itself to further important local
regulatory interests would be a significant change in the American
context. But, of course, there is nothing new about tying the exercise
of regulatory authority over the corporation to the location of its
activities. That is how corporations were allowed to operate for much
of this country's history. 1 5 Moreover, this is consistent with
prevailing choice-of-law doctrine with regard to most corporate
activity. If one considers the universe of regulation of corporate
conduct, very little of it clearly falls within the internal affairs
carve-out. 1
16
As typically applied, the internal affairs doctrine is an outlier.1 17 Its
fixed and nearly automatic application of the law of the state of
incorporation is contrary to conflicts theory following the "conflicts
revolution," as a result of which states abandoned strict, content- and
circumstances-blind conflicts rules in favor of methodologies that
take into account the interests and policies of all states of contact.
1 18
Moreover, by deferring to a state with no operational or other contacts
with the corporation, the doctrine runs counter to the standard
approach to conflicts resolution in which the locus of the activity to
be regulated and its effects are primary factors in determining which
state ought to exercise regulatory authority. 119 Indeed, seemingly
114 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 111-12, 122 (arguing that corporate law should
be subject to conflict rules for corporate governance consistent with the rules applicable in other
areas); Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 416-17.
115 See Tung, supra note 12, at 46-47, 54-55.
116 See Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 694-95.
n17See, e.g., Tung, supra note 12, at 39 (stating that "the internal affairs doctrine is
remarkable").
118 See Kozyris, supra note 76, at 16-17 ("In the new conflicts calculus, the interests and
policies of the forum state, especially the protection of forum domiciliaries, weigh heavily in
favor of applying its law-the 'lex fori.' Fixed, single-factor, content-blind, forum-neutral rules
are supposed to be particularly obnoxious because they defer automatically and totally to one
legal system in disregard of the interests and policies of the other states of contact. The lex
incorporationis is precisely such a rule.").
119See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 6 (general principles); id. § 6 cmt. f ("In
general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are most deeply affected should have its local
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recognizing the anomalous character of the internal affairs norm, the
drafters of the Restatement hedged both in Section 302 itself and in
its adjoining comments. 120 My proposal is simply that states treat
internal affairs no differently than other subjects of local regulation.
The continuing prevalence of the internal affairs doctrine also is
not the product of a neutral assessment of its efficiency as a
horizontal choice-of-law norm.12 1 It is instead the result of both
cognitive deficiencies and interest group dynamics. Those who have
paid the closest attention tend to benefit from either the substantive
outcomes or the chartering business it produces; others have largely
failed to consider its implications or viable alternatives.
22
Indeed, the doctrine's most ardent defenders-Delaware and
representatives of groups who favor managerial prerogatives-have
powerful incentives to ensure continued, strict adherence to it. 123 The
internal affairs norm has served as a particularly effective
deregulatory device: framed in neutral terms, facially consistent with
norms of federalism, largely taken for granted by generations of
lawyers and judges, and one step removed from potentially
controversial aspects of underlying substantive law, the doctrine has
covertly marginalized the influence of other constituencies over
corporate law. 124 To date, the only persistent threat to those who
benefit from the current regime has been vertical-federalization-
rather than horizontal.
There is good reason to be skeptical of claims that the internal
affairs doctrine is either necessary or more efficient than the
alternatives. Nevertheless, I will address the various arguments its
supporters offer for retaining the internal affairs doctrine. In a
nutshell, they contend that the state-to-state competition the doctrine
facilitates enhances legal innovation that improves efficiency; the
law applied."); id. § 145 (torts); Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 417.
120 Section 302 of the Restatement (stating the basic internal affairs rule) expressly
contemplates that the law of the state of incorporation will not apply when another state has a
greater regulatory interest. Comment e to this Section recognizes that other states may have a
strong interest in regulating internal affairs and indicates that the incorporating state's interest is
particularly weak when it has no operational or other contacts with the firm. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 42, § 302 cmt. e.
121 Daniel Greenwood has made a similar argument: corporate law and the way in which
the internal affairs doctrine frames and constrains it is political rather than economic.
Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 45; see also Tung, supra note 12, at 38
(stating the internal affairs doctrine's development depended on a "fortuitous sequence of
events" driven by ideology, interest group influences, and inertia).
'
22 See supra Part I.B.3.
123 See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
124 See Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 86 ("When corporations
choose corporate law, the result is not freedom of citizens, but freedom from citizens.").
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certainty and uniformity it provides are necessary for firms to
function; and the Constitution prohibits other states from regulating
corporate internal affairs. Upon examination, none of these arguments
is persuasive.
1. Legal Innovation
Race-to-the-top theorists in particular have hailed the internal
affairs doctrine and the resulting current corporate-law production
regime as enhancing efficiency by facilitating legal innovation. They
argue that state-to-state competition creates incentives to improve
legal doctrine and enforcement mechanisms because market forces
will ensure that managers opt, through the chartering decision, for the
law that maximizes firm value.
25
Putting aside the complexity of the race-to-the-bottom/race-to-the-
top debate, the reality is that the internal affairs doctrine stifles all but
one kind of genuine legal creativity. As should come as no surprise,
because chartering is controlled by managers, the innovation resulting
from state-to-state competition has been almost exclusively in one
direction. There is only one kind of "buyer" in the market for
corporate law, and it should not be any surprise that the resulting
product manifests creativity only in satisfying those buyers' interests.
This has resulted in relative uniformity across jurisdictions-a
permissive regime akin to Delaware's that largely favors default
terms, private ordering, and deference to managerial decision making.
Indeed, states seeking to retain charters of locally-based firms or
otherwise cut into Delaware's market share have utilized even
more manager-friendly doctrinal carrots-including anti-takeover
statutes. 26  Shareholder advocates have long recognized this
phenomenon, challenged the claims that interjurisdictional
competition produces efficient corporate legal norms, 127  and
advocated federal reform in response.1
28
Even more profoundly, regardless of who has the better argument
in the race debate, the internal affairs doctrine all but eliminates the
possibility of wide-scale corporate-law reform designed to address
other stakeholder interests-reforms that might ultimately lead to
'
25 See supra note 8.
126 Nevada's attempts to cut into Delaware's market share through manager-friendly legal
norms are a well-known example. See, e.g., Nevada Corporate Planners, Inc., 16 Reasons to
Incorporate in Nevada, http://www.nvinc.com/IncorporateInNevada.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2009). Delaware, however, enjoys other unique advantages that make it difficult for Nevada and
other states to compete. See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 25, at 99-102.
127 See supra note 31.
128 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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more efficient internal arrangements. 129 Certainly, one can argue
against such reforms on their merits, but that does not justify a regime
that allows managers alone to determine whether such reforms will
even be considered. The bottom line is that the ability of managers to
opt out of any corporate legal regime they do not like ensures that
experimentation that they perceive as, on balance, less favorable to
them-as opposed to the firm as a whole-will not take hold on any
wide scale.
Moreover, because of the internal affairs doctrine and Delaware's
unique advantages in the market for charters, Delaware's decision
makers can focus primarily on the threat of federalization. Even in
times of popular discontent with corporate actors, such as post-Enron,
they have largely succeeded in limiting such intervention. This is one
reason why the Delaware Supreme Court has claimed that the internal
affairs doctrine is constitutionally mandated and industry groups have
pressed for federal prohibitions on state corporate-law enforcement
efforts. They want to eliminate the second front-the possibility that
other states might innovate in other directions. 30 Competition in
creative law does not appear to be much of a value in this context.
The regime that would result from abandoning strict adherence to
the internal affairs doctrine is, in fact, more consistent with the
dynamic potential of federalism and the competition that it should
encourage. First, such a regime would facilitate local experimentation
in corporate firm forms and structures that at least account for the
interests of stakeholders-including shareholders-who do not
control the chartering decision.' 3' Experimentation is already
occurring on the margins, 132 but it cannot take hold on a wider scale
until managers of firms operating locally do not have the ability to
opt-out by foreign charter. States would have the ability, for example,
to test different corporate-law arrangements to determine which are
most efficient at internalizing social costs and other stakeholder
interests while promoting shareholder returns.
Moreover, abandoning the internal affairs doctrine would produce
a more genuine and robust state-federal dynamic than the
Delaware-Washington interaction that currently prevails. As in other
129 See GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 117 ("As long as the internal affairs doctrine applies,
changes in corporate governance will be unavailable. Fewer regulatory options will usually
result in less efficient and more costly regulation and will move the end result away from what
is best for general welfare.").
1
3 0 See Glynn, supra note 25, at 134.
131 See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE
L.J. 947, 997-1001 (2001) (discussing the normative values of federalism that the U.S. system
of dual sovereignty serves, including local experimentation).
132 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35 (2007).
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areas of the law, different states can function as laboratories within
which new approaches to law and regulation are fashioned, tested,
and improved or abandoned. 3 3 If and when it chooses to regulate, the
federal government can adopt the models that work. Moreover,
successful state reform can prod reluctant or captured federal actors
into action. 134 Furthermore, as in other areas, if state experimentation
fails-becoming overly burdensome, contrary to national policy,
or otherwise more appropriately regulated at the national level-
federalization would remain the safety valve.
This approach to the production of corporate law also would make
corporations more democratically accountable-reflecting not only
another norm of federalism, but also a basic tenet of democratic
theory. 135 An enormous amount of corporate law in this country is
made by ten Delaware jurists, almost completely unaccountable to the
vast universe of the stakeholders corporate law affects. 136 Basic
democratic principles suggest that those primarily affected by
corporate activity ought to have a voice in how corporations
behave. 137 The point is not that the corporation is a democracy; rather,
it is that, as creations of law, corporations and their governance ought
to be subject to more direct democratic oversight. Currently, they are
not. Indeed, the basic premises of corporate law are not even subject
to much democratic debate. 138 Abandoning strict adherence to the
internal affairs doctrine guarantees no particular substantive outcome.
But the prospect of stakeholder-generated regulation over corporate
decision making would make those who govern corporations more
accountable to the communities within which their enterprises have a
significant impact.
2. Certainty and Uniformity
A second objection to abandoning strict adherence to the internal
affairs doctrine is that, under an alternative choice-of-law regime,
corporate actors would be subject to uncertain and potentially
conflicting legal obligations. 39  Other horizontal choice-of-law
133 Cf New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
134 See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Firms Are Ready to
Pay $1 Billion in Fines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al (discussing how New York's
pressing for Wall Street reform pushed the SEC to participate in the resolution).
13 Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 41-42.
136 Delaware's corporate law is largely made, modified, and enforced by its five
Chancellors and five Supreme Court Justices. See Glynn, supra note 25, at 98.
137 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 110, 119; Greenwood, Markets and Democracy,
supra note 6, at 41-42.
138 Greenwood, Markets and Democracy, supra note 6, at 48.
19 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at I11.
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regimes, it is argued, would open up the possibility of more than one
state seeking to regulate internal firm relationships, which may
produce both conflict between jurisdictions who seek to impose their
own forms of corporate law on a firm and great uncertainty among
corporate participants regarding whose legal mandates apply.
This concern is legitimate but exaggerated, 140 and not substantively
different than the concerns that drive all law affecting multistate
players in a country with at least fifty-one jurisdictions. 141 First of all,
such a regime may create far less uncertainty than it first appears. For
example, it is not a problem for the vast majority of entities, which
are closely held firms whose operational and equity investor contacts
are concentrated within a single jurisdiction. While managers in this
context might prefer application of the corporate law of some other
state, they would know ex ante the extent to which such application is
unlikely under an alternative choice-of-law framework.
Also, firms with substantial operations or equity investor interests
in different states can reduce uncertainty through planning. For
example, if a firm is concerned that the law of the state in which its
operations are concentrated might conflict with that of its state of
incorporation, it can reincorporate in the former jurisdiction, thereby
eliminating the conflict. While managers might prefer to incorporate
elsewhere (say, in Delaware), uncertainty or potential conflict can be
avoided in this way, which suggests the real concern is something
more substantive. In addition, to the extent a firm might face multiple
states' imposing truly conflicting corporate law obligations, it can
operate in one or more of the jurisdictions through separately
incorporated subsidiaries. 142
Moreover, corporate decision makers can still remove operations
and activities from a jurisdiction that might seek to impose conflicting
legal norms. This threat of exit itself or the threatened refusal to enter
is also a check against lawmakers imposing overzealous regulation in
the first place. Of course, opting out via physical exit is far more
costly than simply chartering elsewhere, but the opportunity to
remove operations provides firms with a means of avoiding
conflicting legal obligations and a meaningful check against what
they perceive as excessively burdensome regulation.14
3
140 Again, it is exaggerated by those who have powerful incentives to promote continued
adherence to the doctrine. See Glynn, supra note 25, at 140 (noting that, despite claims to the
contrary by Delaware and industry groups, the regulation at issue in recent internal affairs
doctrine cases creates little risk of lingering interstate conflict or uncertainty).
141 Cf Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 664.
14 2 See Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 416.
143 See Tung, supra note 12, at 37 (stating that the possibility of exit creates competitive
pressure to reject regulation).
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Just as the potential for uncertainty is overstated, so too is the need
for uniformity. The prospect of the law of more than one jurisdiction
governing internal arrangements or decision making would not
necessarily leave corporate actors paralyzed by irreconcilable,
conflicting obligations. As in other areas of regulation, many types of
corporate-law reform would not create conflicts that would put
decision makers in the untenable position of having to try to comply
with truly inconsistent legal obligations. For example, if a state
imposed on firms enhanced disclosure obligations, more searching
exceptions to limited liability, or more robust duties to monitor,
managers could comply with these requirements without violating
duties imposed under the law of other states. Undoubtedly, there
would be transaction costs associated with having to comply with
varied legal obligations. While lawmakers ought to consider such
costs in deciding what regulations to impose, the mere possibility
does not make an alternative regime unworkable: in enterprises
operating across state and national borders, corporate actors
constantly navigate a web of different legal rules.
Ex ante predictability and uniform application are more critical
with regard to those aspects of corporate law that establish firm
governance structure or allocate certain decision rights and
obligations among stakeholders. For example, corporate actors need
to be able to predict with some confidence what law will govern who
elects directors and to whom various duties may run. In this context,
absent some ability to accommodate the regulation of other states, the
law of one state should govern.
But this does not mean that strict adherence to the internal affairs
doctrine is necessary. Again, the first line of defense is self-help:
through chartering, firm structuring, and other risk management
techniques, managers can reduce the probability that more than one
state might subject the firm to truly inconsistent legal obligations. If
that fails, or it is imperfect, choice-of-law norms buffered by
principles of comity can reduce or eliminate this concern. For
instance, the need for such predictability and uniformity counsels in
favor of a state limiting application of its law regarding voting rights
to firms whose primary operational or equity investor presence is
within the state. 44 Moreover, it suggests that a state extend the reach
of its law only to the extent necessary to serve the underlying
regulatory purpose. Using Professor Greenfield's proposal as an
144 Cf Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 664 (stating that such problems imply that
only one rule should apply, but that rule could be the law of the corporation's base of
operations, as is the case in some European jurisdictions).
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example, suppose a state enacts a statute that mandates board
representation for employees, and a foreign-chartered firm has its
center of gravity for a firm's operations within the jurisdiction, but its
shareholders are primarily located elsewhere. In such a circumstance,
the state could apply its employee representation mandate but leave
to another jurisdiction-i.e., where shareholder interests are
concentrated or where the firm is incorporated-matters of allocation
of rights between shareholders or shareholder groups.
My purpose is not to offer a comprehensive choice-of-law
framework that addresses every potential corporate-law conflict. It
is simply to suggest that, as is the case elsewhere in the law,
choice-of-law principles that take into account the relevant regulatory
policies, the relative interests of states, and the value of predictability
and uniformity can provide a substitute framework that is both
workable and, for the reasons stated above, better calibrated to reflect
all of the relevant interests at stake than the internal affairs norm. 45
Such an approach would create application issues on the margins,
particularly during a transition period, but so too does the internal
affairs norm. 1
46
Of course, because horizontal choice-of-law and comity principles
are not constitutionally mandated, the potential for interstate conflict
resulting from inconsistent application and regulatory overreaching
remains. A state with a desire to protect local stakeholders but with
few operational or investor contacts with the firm might seek to
impose its preferred governance structure on the entire enterprise,
despite the fact that this structure conflicts irreconcilably with that
mandated by another jurisdiction with greater connections to the firm.
Similarly, the state of incorporation may refuse to recognize the
regulatory prerogatives of states with far greater operational or equity
investor contacts with the firm, and act aggressively to ensure that its
own law governs. Perhaps not surprisingly, Delaware has already
behaved in this way. In various contexts, its courts have made clear
that they will go to great lengths to defend the internal affairs norm
and, consequently, the state's chartering enterprise, even if that means
refusing to consider (much less respect) the regulatory prerogatives of
other states with far greater operational and investor ties to the firm.
Moreover, at least in theory, there may be some enterprises with
145 Thus, for example, a regime which provides that the corporate law of the state of
primary operations-perhaps in combination with the law of other states, provided these laws
do not conflict or can be accommodated-is a viable and preferable alternative to the internal
affairs doctrine.
146What falls inside and outside of the internal affairs doctrine has been the subject of
recent litigation. See Glynn, supra note 25, at 134, 139-40.
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operations and equity investor interests so dispersed that the exercise
of exclusive law-making authority over corporate governance
structures by any state might seem disproportionate to its regulatory
interest. 147
Yet, to the extent regulatory overreaching or interstate conflict
becomes a problem that the states and firms cannot resolve
themselves, federalization of corporate law, rather than privileging
the state of incorporation, ought to be the primary remedy. 148 Again,
this is consistent with the traditional norms of federalism: Congress
should step in and address matters either truly national in scope or as
to which conflicting state approaches might cause substantial
disruption. What is not an appropriate remedy is to default to the law
of the state of incorporation without considering the broader
implications of allowing management to choose its own governing
law.
3. Constitutional Limitations
If the federal government does not act, the question becomes
whether the Constitution places any limits on states' authority to
regulate corporate governance and internal affairs. It does, but only
on the margins.
The Delaware Supreme Court's claim that the internal affairs
doctrine itself is a constitutional imperative under the dormant
Commerce Clause is specious. 149 Professor Jed Rubenfeld decimated
this theory twenty years ago,1 50 and, since then, I and others have
detailed why Delaware's constitutional claims are doctrinally weak
and otherwise evince serious overreaching. 151
Like other constitutional doctrines,1 52 the dormant Commerce
Clause frames the outer boundaries of a state's authority to apply its
own law, but there is tremendous space within which the state can
147 GE might be one such firm, as Professor Dent suggests, see Dent, Stakeholder
Governance, supra note 3, at 1117-18, 1139, although it depends on firm structure and how and
where the firm and any subsidiaries are operated.
148 Cf Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 416.
149 The court recently reasserted this claim in VantagePoint Venture Capital Partners LLP
v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005). See supra note 68.
150 See generally Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the Commerce Clause:
The "Foreign" Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 355 (1988).
151 See Glynn supra note 25, at 117-22 (discussing the literature and why the Delaware
Supreme Court's claims that the doctrine is a constitutional mandate are deeply flawed); see
also Ribstein & O'Hara, supra note 43, at 716-21.
52 The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses simply require that, to apply its own
law to a dispute, a state "must have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312 (1981).
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operate. In a nutshell, under the balancing test set forth in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,1 3 a state regulation will be upheld unless it
discriminates against interstate commerce or the burden it imposes on
commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." This suggests that a state with which a corporation has few
operational or equity investor connections might be prohibited from
seeking to subject the entire firm to its corporate law, particularly in
circumstances where that law created irreconcilable conflicts with the
law of another jurisdiction with a substantially greater interest in
regulating. But it falls far short of, and indeed provides no support
for, the proposition that states with more robust connections to
foreign firms cannot regulate their internal affairs. 154 As I argue
elsewhere, the later Supreme Court cases invoking the dormant
Commerce Clause (in dicta) in the context of challenges to state anti-
takeover statutes do not alter this conclusion. 1
55
Finally, consider how bizarre Delaware's proposed constitutional
regime would be. After all, as Professor Fredrick Tung has suggested,
states could require-as they once did-that every enterprise
operating within the jurisdiction incorporate therein. 156 Moreover, it
would be ironic if the dormant Commerce Clause imposed such a
barrier, not only because the modern, interstate corporate enterprise
did not exist at the time of the Constitution's enactment, but also
because of the slender reed on which the chartering state's regulatory
interests now hang.' 57 Elevating the internal affairs doctrine to a
constitutional mandate would, in many circumstances, privilege the
prerogatives of a state with few or no operational or equity investor
ties to the enterprise over all other states. 158 Indeed, while the
Supreme Court has suggested that the state of incorporation has a
regulatory interest in corporate internal affairs, 159 and Delaware
frequently repeats the mantra, 160 no one has articulated with precision
153 97 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
154 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 150, at 357-58.
155 See Glynn, supra note 25, at 117-23. See also generally Rubenfeld, supra note 150, at
358-76 (same).
156 See Tung, supra note 12, at 37, 44 (observing that states have the power to apply
monopolizing corporate law to finns operating within their borders).
157 See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 6, at 108 (stating that incorporation in Delaware does
not mean that the state has any interest at all in the firm). The Comments to Restatement §
302(2) are revealing in this respect.
158 See, e.g., Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware, supra note 6, at 413.
159CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) ("It is thus an accepted
part of the business landscape in this country for States to create corporations, prescribe their
powers, and define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A state has an interest
in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters, as well
as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs.").
160 See, e.g., VantagePoint Venture Capital Partners LLP v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108,
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why that interest is unique or why it ought to outweigh (categorically
or otherwise) the interests of other states withfar greater connections
to the firm and its stakeholders.1
6 1
Thus, the bottom line is that while states still usually abide by the
internal affairs norm, they do so voluntarily. States can and-for the
reasons stated earlier-should rethink their adherence to the doctrine.
As in other areas of corporate regulation, firm risk management,
choice-of-law principles, comity, and federalization are the principal
safeguards against any interstate conflict that might result.
CONCLUSION
Corporate law drives corporate decision making. While we take
for granted that states will regulate broadly firms that operate within
them, we have, oddly enough, allowed corporate managers to opt
out of local regulation by selecting the corporate law of their choice.
This system of production has predictable results: it leads to
substantive outcomes that favor managers, it ensures that corporate
legal norms will further the interests of other stakeholders only to
the extent that they do not vary significantly from managerial
preferences, and it stifles genuine legal innovation. If corporations
and corporate actors are going to be accountable to the communities
most affected by their decisions, and if substantive corporate law is to
have a genuine regulatory role, this must change. Stakeholder
communities-communities within which firm activities have
substantial effects-must make and enforce corporate law.
1112 (Del. 2005); McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 215 (Del. 1987).
161 In stating that the state of incorporation has an interest in regulating internal affairs, the
CTS Court-in addition to relying on history and tradition-refers to the interests of promoting
stability and protecting investors. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 91. Yet it does not explain why
these interests are uniquely linked to the chartering state or why another state's law might not
also promote stability and investor protection (perhaps even to a greater extent). Moreover, it
offers no genuine assessment of the relative strength of the chartering state's interest or whether
this interest is meaningful when other states with far greater connections to the firm and its
stakeholders seek to regulate. Indeed, in comment g to Section 302, the drafters of the
Restatement concede that, although the rule presumes application of the law of the state of
incorporation because it furthers factors of certainty, uniformity, and party expectations, where
the corporation has little or no contact with the state of incorporation "some other state will
almost surely have a greater interest than the state of incorporation in the determination of the
particular issue." RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 302, cmt. g.
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